<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"><channel><title>Posts from @limonta</title><description>RSS feed for @limonta&apos;s blog on Hive</description><link>https://hiverss.com/</link><atom:link href="https://hiverss.com/@limonta.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Why I Expect Nothing from the Xi–Trump–Putin Meeting</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/why-i-expect-nothing-from</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/why-i-expect-nothing-from</guid><description>As many experts have already explained, it is unlikely that any watershed moment will emerge from the Xi–Trump–Putin trilateral meeting. Trump himself has said that we will have to see, at least, whether a big change or effect can begin to take shape from the encounter. “Let’s see if we can get…</description><pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:12:39 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmNgXtTXBCgsPqCAhJmFU1NvSHbX9jA1o9urC5fZGWnmGc/hxedhvha4aaptay.jpeg&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;As many experts have already explained, it is unlikely that any watershed moment will emerge from the Xi–Trump–Putin trilateral meeting. Trump himself has said that we will have to see, at least, whether a big change or effect can begin to take shape from the encounter. “Let’s see if we can get something done,” he stressed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All the fanfare and the journalistic circus in the coverage were to be expected. With the information market devalued, media outlets must monetize the three leaders&apos; exposure in the showcase. But the world doesn’t need this show, nor more statements and inane calls for peace and harmony.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yes, this meeting would be fantastic if they truly solved a concrete problem, such as a war or one of the many humanitarian crises of our time, given that they have enough economic resources and influence over the international chessboard to make it happen. Especially if they did so in strict adherence to what is just in each case, and didn’t act like the big fish that eats the little one.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It would also be fantastic if Trump’s pacifist rhetoric, the idea that we must sit down and talk, that things can’t be done the old-fashioned way, weren’t so strongly contradicted by his actual practice, looking at the Cuban case, just to cite one example. He is squeezing an entire population, playing at regime change with no regard for the humanitarian consequences of the attack on the jugular of the Cuban economy that began in his first administration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;“No problems were ever solved under the old school, refusing to talk about them. No peace was ever forged by declining opportunities for engagement and speech,” he said.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And, interestingly, the Cuban problem is itself paramount here. From MAGA Washington, they can argue that they have tried to “dialogue” with Cuba and that the regime has turned rough. But, once again, the point is that this dialogue is no dialogue at all. It is the pursuit of submission to the designs of whoever has the most muscle. If you don’t do what I tell you, I punish you. That is the dialogue. And it is old school.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In truth, nothing is more old school than the very idea that the three of them should decide for everyone else. I point this out to put on the record that China and Russia lend themselves to this game.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Therefore, I do not expect anything of this, but I will let time bear witness.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://x.com/VeraMBergen/status/2123338958390386934&quot;&gt;Source&lt;/a&gt; of the cover image, via X.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTJpU2QEEn3cMFiMF4KHr5VQg13X6gCTjiwBpd3YdA8WU/thanks_for_your_reading_1_.gif&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-120417</category></item><item><title>Trump and the decay of democratic debate (or American democracy in general)</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/trump-and-the-decay-of</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/trump-and-the-decay-of</guid><description>I believe the discussion about democracy is increasingly being devalued around the world. I don&apos;t care much what the sociopolitical system governing a country is called. For me, democracy is the growing, efficient, and binding involvement of citizens in decision-making and accountability processes,…</description><pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 23:27:09 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmSdoaHf1fEL9jPkPcwh4B6zr5j5kuWznetFwMkH7Zz2ox/obqfffrm.jpeg&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;I believe the discussion about democracy is increasingly being devalued around the world. I don&apos;t care much what the sociopolitical system governing a country is called. For me, democracy is the growing, efficient, and binding involvement of citizens in decision-making and accountability processes, or, failing that, the dynamic correspondence between those processes and the popular interest.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Of course, it can&apos;t end there, because then we fall into discussions about whether it&apos;s right for the citizenry at large to decide, say, the judges of a Supreme Court. Citizens deciding is only relevant and powerful insofar as we&apos;re talking about an informed, educated citizenry—hard to sway or manipulate, able to distinguish between facts and the editorializing of those facts, between journalism and propaganda, and so on.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And then there&apos;s the sacrosanct matter of the vote, which has been thematized to the point where the possibility of voting or choosing is equated with democracy. Indeed, many Western theorists have addressed the great error of reducing democracy to going to the polls once every two or four years. For example, focusing on the American case—and this is not a critique of the American model &lt;em&gt;per se&lt;/em&gt;, as valid as any other—I&apos;ve always found it interesting that the electorate cannot recall a member of the federal Congress, or that there are no referendum initiatives at the federal level. Because, again, perhaps the most important part of the democratic game begins after that Tuesday or Sunday when one goes to the polls. Or, in any case, in the process by which the offer you vote on is decided.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And this is where the figure of Donald Trump strikes me as interesting, because I&apos;m certain that the best offer available to the American electorate, at least in the last elections, could by no means have resulted in a ballot with Biden and Trump as the protagonists. I&apos;m sure there&apos;s something better, and the democratic process, if it&apos;s good and sound, healthy, should naturally bring forth that superior offer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And lastly, there&apos;s the issue of public political communication. I don&apos;t understand how the erosion Trump represents in this regard doesn&apos;t translate into open rejection of his irrational discourse. Take, for example, &lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/trump-iran-talks-strikes-limbo-02378df1ec3073d2c0f8f162e697d181&quot;&gt;this wire&lt;/a&gt; that AP published today. How many erratic comings and goings have we seen from Trump throughout this war against Iran? Iran has won the game so far beyond all its deaths, because little or nothing of what Trump has said or promised is true or has happened. That Tehran is &quot;desperate&quot; for a deal, that the Strait of Hormuz is open, now that perhaps there&apos;s no need to attack further or seek any agreement. Cuba is another case study.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;American democracy, I repeat, is a legitimate model, but its implementation will speak ill of it as long as Trump owns the Resolute desk, especially if he keeps opening his mouth as much as he enjoys doing, colluding with the press.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://x.com/nytimes/status/1988602025521594376&quot;&gt;Source&lt;/a&gt; for the cover image.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTJpU2QEEn3cMFiMF4KHr5VQg13X6gCTjiwBpd3YdA8WU/thanks_for_your_reading_1_.gif&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-120417</category></item><item><title>Cuba Was Never Easy. Then Came Trump</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/cuba-was-never-easy-then</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/cuba-was-never-easy-then</guid><description>The Cuban sociopolitical system&apos;s ability to withstand being the target of the most comprehensive sanctions regime Washington imposes anywhere in the world was due, in large part, to Soviet support until 1990 and, later, to the almost providential emergence of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, a horse Fidel…</description><pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 01:55:54 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmcgYhTusuhDaCAFT3U6wQjQDnEmH1sFr4eNBxvLTxYd1K/rzy0efn_.jpeg&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Cuban sociopolitical system&apos;s ability to withstand being the target of the most comprehensive sanctions regime Washington imposes anywhere in the world was due, in large part, to Soviet support until 1990 and, later, to the almost providential emergence of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, a horse Fidel Castro bet on and backed successfully.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Looking at what has happened in 2026, sanctions may appear almost secondary before this point in history, but that would be a gross error. Since 2019, during Trump&apos;s &lt;em&gt;first&lt;/em&gt; administration, the poisoned darts launched from the White House, the State Department, and OFAC have become far more precise and destructive. The chokehold aimed at suffocating the Cuban economy has tightened beyond anything seen before, while the obstacles, pressure campaigns, and penalties imposed on foreign partners connected to Cuba have grown far harsher.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, the escalation initiated by Trump more than seven years ago, and pushed into uncharted territory this year following Maduro&apos;s removal from power in Venezuela, has become extraordinarily aggressive and all-encompassing. The reality depicted by the Associated Press in &lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/cuba-food-insecurity-soup-kitchens-pantry-crisis-df4ab742dff562680946644847341db0&quot;&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; wire from today, where an ever-growing number of Cubans struggle merely to survive, simply did not exist in this form. I don&apos;t understand Rubio&apos;s &quot;argument&quot; that the problem is that the Cuban state has always sought to keep people dependent on it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ultimately, and of course there is a deeper philosophical debate here between two mutually exclusive social and political systems, the issue is that my university used to be full of students attending classes in person. Today, they can only do so for a &lt;em&gt;single&lt;/em&gt; month during the &lt;em&gt;entire&lt;/em&gt; academic year. Even that became possible only after the university arranged a long-distance barter agreement with a private small business. In exchange for leasing out unused storage facilities, the university receives fuel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The people you see in the AP video that runs &lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/cuba-food-insecurity-soup-kitchens-pantry-crisis-df4ab742dff562680946644847341db0&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;, sleeping on the ground overnight in order to receive charity in the form of a small serving of split-pea stew, would not be carrying such an overwhelming burden of misery. Contending with rising prices in the face of runaway inflation, especially after the state lost its dominant position --for bad so far-- as the principal supplier of goods and services to a growing private sector, was already a daunting, almost Herculean task. But, again, it was not anything like this.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Washington may care only about the expansion of Cuba&apos;s private sector, regardless of how many people are actually able to improve their lives through it. So the second Trump administration is pursuing regime change without any apparent regard for the social cost of the experiment: widespread material hardship and a growing sense of psychological disorientation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So if Cubans already had a hard time dealing with domestic problems, problems that, in fairness, are hardly unique to Cuba since every country struggles with some degree of governmental mismanagement, then what has all of this been for?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://x.com/NBCNews/status/2121302112755691854&quot;&gt;Source&lt;/a&gt; for the cover image.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTJpU2QEEn3cMFiMF4KHr5VQg13X6gCTjiwBpd3YdA8WU/thanks_for_your_reading_1_.gif&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-120417</category></item><item><title>Shipping a private, paywalled web app with no budget</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-196387/@limonta/shipping-a-private-paywalled-web</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-196387/@limonta/shipping-a-private-paywalled-web</guid><description>With Claude&apos;s massive support, I developed a regulatory monitor for people who want to trade legally on the US.-Cuba route, a.k.a. the Cuba Sanctions Hub. As you already know, it is a Node/Express app, plus a sister Streamlit app exclusively for Census trade data. My goal over the past two days has…</description><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 04:59:39 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmWdiVSngJCWQgtRTfaPpq26qsh3CTD8dSe47dP8pS7B6o/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_09_00_43_57.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;With Claude&apos;s massive support, I developed a regulatory monitor for people who want to trade legally on the US.-Cuba route, a.k.a. the &lt;em&gt;Cuba Sanctions Hub&lt;/em&gt;. As you already know, it is a Node/Express app, plus a sister Streamlit app exclusively for Census trade data. My goal over the past two days has been to deploy the hub online and monetize access. My constraints were harsh: &lt;strong&gt;private code, zero budget, and every screen behind a login&lt;/strong&gt;. Here is how it went, including what Claude got wrong the first time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Who did what&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude wrote the code, tests, and docs, although it cannot test against the actual API, or push or deploy for me. In this sense, Claude&apos;s commits carry an explicit trailer, which I like because it makes authorship honest:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 &amp;lt;noreply@anthropic.com&amp;gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;GitHub&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two private repos, SSH authentication from my MX-Linux box. Pushes failed first with &quot;Repository not found&quot; (a wrong repo name, not a permissions problem), then worked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmNnB6xvuegjWecpeAScdwxzje11inQTX8Cuv4zLJxS5a2/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_09_00_45_46.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmZe2epjRSmPWqAPcd5vUYaAtQi6gSSvg6xUfUGT8xP1AS/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_09_00_46_48.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;h2&gt;The Render wall&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Render was the first target. Its &quot;Free&quot; tier still demands a credit card, and I found no documented way around it. Neither Claude. Borrowing a friend&apos;s card is a bad idea --I want to achieve things without owing anything to anyone--, and an overage billing risk on a zero-budget project is a non-starter. We dropped Render rather than hack around it. SnapDeploy&apos;s free tier needs no card: 0.25 vCPU --even better than Render on this--, sleeps after 15 idle minutes, 100 awake hours a month, ephemeral disk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Claude&apos;s mistakes (all fixed, none hidden)&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;The Dockerfile still exposed Render&apos;s port 10000; SnapDeploy manages &lt;code&gt;PORT&lt;/code&gt; itself and rejected my env var. Fix: &lt;code&gt;EXPOSE 3000&lt;/code&gt;, no &lt;code&gt;PORT&lt;/code&gt; variable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;A comment placed inline inside a JS object swallowed the properties after it and broke two tests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Login returned a 503 for correct passwords. The server log said &lt;code&gt;[auth] perfil 403&lt;/code&gt;: I had disabled Supabase&apos;s automatic table exposure, so the &lt;code&gt;perfiles&lt;/code&gt; table needed explicit grants.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;grant usage on schema public to authenticated;
grant select on public.perfiles to authenticated;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Supabase: access control and monetization&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Quick config here is Supabase Auth plus one table with row-level security. Signups are disabled, so I create users and activate plans manually (free Supabase email only reaches team members, about two per hour). Each profile has &lt;code&gt;plan&lt;/code&gt; (&lt;code&gt;generico&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;pago&lt;/code&gt;), &lt;code&gt;activo&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;vence&lt;/code&gt;. The server verifies the token on every request, fails closed with a 503 if auth is down, and refuses to start on a public host without Supabase. Sessions live in HttpOnly cookies, and the publishable key never reaches the browser&apos;s JavaScript.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generic plan browses everything read-only. The paid plan unlocks downloads, enforced on the server:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;if (/^\/auth\//.test(pathname)) return true;                  // login/logout always allowed
if (plan !== &apos;pago&apos;) return method === &apos;GET&apos; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !PAID_ONLY.some(re =&amp;gt; re.test(pathname));
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmW5G66VMxkjQFZiRseQvGMv5hcTznFowDWt3hBHizU4yw/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_09_00_41_13.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmeq5yrRt2CwHGZSsKhuVLy4Tj9kjrM9siXoHiVymXHLMe/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_09_00_42_17.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;On the user side, the browser only shows a courtesy popup. Idle sessions now close after 60 minutes, tracked server-side. Payment-processor terms are noted, not legal advice.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Added while deploying&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Optional toggle for unpublished Census corrections: they conserve total value, skip anything the API already revised, and report what was omitted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;A fix for an OFAC download failing with &lt;code&gt;CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED&lt;/code&gt;: adding &lt;code&gt;ca-certificates&lt;/code&gt; to the image. &lt;strong&gt;Unverified in production&lt;/strong&gt;, and a TLS-inspecting proxy could still be the cause.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;A &quot;Partners in the US&quot; section (Council lists, USDA directories). The Council PDFs date from 2019–2020, so the app shows dates and drops companies I know were absorbed or dissolved.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tomorrow will be a big day for this effort, as I will try to sell the Hub&apos;s services to Cuban economic actors. Will see.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTJpU2QEEn3cMFiMF4KHr5VQg13X6gCTjiwBpd3YdA8WU/thanks_for_your_reading_1_.gif&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-196387</category></item><item><title>Can the Left in Latin America Rebuild Itself?</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/can-the-left-in-latin</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/can-the-left-in-latin</guid><description>First, we have to distinguish which Left is supposed to return, or what we are prepared to settle for. In this regard, the first question is whether the Left must be anti-capitalist or not, anti-imperialist or not, timid or not; whether it plays by the rules of liberal democracy or not, both in its…</description><pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 07:04:30 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmaDjUqQWrC5dh5iZANpMetn9bwFUuPrEqKec394BN3QTY/latin_america_s_political_reckoning.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;First, we have to distinguish which Left is supposed to return, or what we are prepared to settle for. In this regard, the first question is whether the Left must be anti-capitalist or not, anti-imperialist or not, timid or not; whether it plays by the rules of liberal democracy or not, both in its identity and in the practical expression of that identity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The so-called “Pink Tide” of the first decade of this century feels like ancient history from today&apos;s perspective. In Venezuela, the Rodríguez brothers&apos; Chavismo 3.0 is bowing its head to Washington—quite literally, if we consider the astonishing official celebrations of the American Declaration of Independence, complete with a toast. Evo Morales ended up at loggerheads with another &lt;em&gt;Aymara&lt;/em&gt;, Choquehuanca (this split, given that both come from the same Indigenous ethnic group, is more significant than his fruitless feud with Arce). Correa is in exile in Belgium, his first successor betrayed him, and his latest political bet, Luisa González, is behind bars. We will not get into the often murky judicial proceedings that have led to these outcomes, nor into the authoritarian, quasi-dictatorial nature of Daniel Noboa&apos;s government. For now, let us look at the practical reality.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTunzXb9sd5VP2DehXqDZx25ioo4Cv4NkDRgUQkW7Ypcq/photo_5145803680756993485_y.jpg&quot; alt=&quot;Image taken from Jorge Rodríguez&apos;s official Telegram channel&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;Over time, in Uruguay, the late Mujica renounced Marxism and, to a considerable extent, went on to defend the institutions of capitalism. Yamandú Orsi, incidentally, is a long way from being Mujica. We know where Cristina Fernández and the complacent Peronism ended up. It is about as far left as anyone can get while holding court at the Pink House, but it does not represent Argentina&apos;s more homegrown Left: the one that urged voters to hold their noses and vote for Sergio Massa rather than Milei, choosing the lesser of two evils. Petro failed to ensure that his political force would remain in the Nariño&apos;s House, and his international impact was limited, beyond his posts on X. In Brazil, it remains to be seen whether Lula, particularly if he understands that this really will be his final term, can recover at least half of what Lula 1.0 represented. Even then, he never fully won over or satisfied the interests of the vast majority of his electoral base, including the Landless Workers&apos; Movement and left-wing figures such as Frei Betto.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mexico is there and not there, but everyone looks toward the United States and fears it, especially in the age of Trump. Cuba&apos;s case proves it. In Peru, it proved impossible to prevent the shameful return of a Fujimori to the seat of government in the Pizarro&apos;s House. Gabriel Boric betrayed himself, and the result is a Kast whose ship has already begun to take on water. In Panama, Honduras, and Guatemala—in the latter, with Juan José Arévalo&apos;s son in the presidency—the Left is failing to get its act together, caught between self-inflicted setback and external obstruction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The outlook is hardly encouraging. Some sectors of the Left have ended up administering their positions of power with greater concern for preserving them than for transforming the conditions that made their arrival possible. They have confused pragmatism with surrender, alliances with principles, and governability with immobility. This reveals how difficult it has become to turn electoral victories and access to government into lasting transformation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And, after all, the most important question is this: where are the people grounded in that part of the political spectrum? The people with drive, strength, a desire for change, and the resolve not to give in or go home without seeing their major demands for change met. Are they reduced to the thousand or so people who recently took to the streets in Ecuador to denounce Daniel Noboa? Will the Left struggle to make a forceful return to Paraguay&apos;s López Palace after the Ueno Bank affair?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rebuilding it, then, cannot simply mean waiting for the Right to wear itself out, capitalizing on its mistakes, or finding new faces for the next electoral contests. If it does not want to be subsumed, the Left must step forward and fight for its place; recover its identity and its ability to mobilize, and rebuild from the ground up. Otherwise, it will end up trapped in a managerial Left, held hostage by agendas that are no less conservative simply because they favor electoral alliances and the preservation of the status quo. And perhaps, by then, the question will no longer be whether the Left can return, but whether, when it does, it will still be the Left.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/can-the-left-in-latin&quot;&gt;Read the full post&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-120417</category></item><item><title>Is This What the Right Came Back For?</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/is-this-what-the-right</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-120417/@limonta/is-this-what-the-right</guid><description>The right has done little more than drive the knife deeper into the wounds inflicted by the left on itself, right where the blood was already flowing. Right-wing politicians have ridden on the back of internal power struggles, contradictions, and mistakes arising from the timid, sometimes corrupt or…</description><pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 03:26:21 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmPvoQ27yKjS6qbrxiuUhE5JtgVKKDPX6sVRpoydMmoeTo/latin_american_leaders_comparison.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;The right has done little more than drive the knife deeper into the wounds inflicted by the left on itself, right where the blood was already flowing. Right-wing politicians have ridden on the back of internal power struggles, contradictions, and mistakes arising from the timid, sometimes corrupt or strategically inept exercise of power. They have also become very adept at exploiting the characteristics of today&apos;s voters, victims of intellectual dumbing-down, widespread trivialization, the logic of &quot;punishing for the sake of punishing&quot; or &quot;changing for the sake of changing,&quot; and artificial intelligence. But what lessons are emerging for voters who put their faith in these politicians in countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay—to name just three cases?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Milei&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I keep wondering how someone like Milei could ever have made it into the Pink House. Something must be seriously wrong with democracy at some crucial point in the process. Take the scandalous LIBRA cryptocurrency case, for instance. There is no way to defend it, however you look at it. But beyond the corruption, the country&apos;s risk premium—a variable Milei should be fighting to bring down, given his focus on macroeconomics—is telling. This indicator has now reached &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/el-riesgo-pa%C3%ADs-de-argentina-salta-a-nuevo-m%C3%A1ximo-en-un-a%C3%B1o/92336215&quot;&gt;its highest level&lt;/a&gt; in more than a year and a half, making it harder for Milei&apos;s government, supposedly &quot;specialists in growing the economy with or without money,&quot; to attract investment. Uncertainty is growing among investors as they assess the country&apos;s economic and political outlook.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Chile&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And Kast? Well, not so well. According to &lt;a href=&quot;https://cadem.cl/estudios/aprobacion-del-presidente-kast-cae-a-26-3pts-su-nivel-mas-bajo-y-acumula-un-retroceso-de-7-puntos-desde-que-comenzara-el-caso-rabat/&quot;&gt;a highly reputable polling firm&lt;/a&gt;, three out of every four Chileans currently disapprove of his performance, particularly following the revelations surrounding the so-called Rabat case. At the center of the latest debate is the easing of sentences involving 56 individuals convicted of (child) sexual child sexual. But Kast&apos;s problems with voters go beyond this issue. He has not even been in office for a year.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Paraguay&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;These politicians come to power preaching morality and promising they will not plunder the public treasury. Yet experience has exposed their shortcomings remarkably quickly. Starting Monday, Santiago Peña is set to face impeachment proceedings in which he will have to answer serious allegations concerning his alleged ties to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/la-presidencia-confirma-que-santiago-pe%c3%b1a-permanece-en-paraguay/92336525&quot;&gt;Ueno Bank&lt;/a&gt;. In addition, prosecutors are after him in connection with three criminal investigations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Then?&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Perhaps the most important lesson is that voting against the left does not necessarily mean voting for a better alternative. Disillusionment, frustration, and a legitimate desire for change can become tools in the hands of those who know how to exploit public discontent but do not necessarily have better answers to the underlying problems. This new (far-right) movement came to power promising order, efficiency, economic growth, and honesty. Yet all too soon, the very same failings it claimed to be fighting are beginning to surface, sometimes in even more brazen forms. This, in turn, does not absolve the left of its mistakes or guarantee it a second chance. On the contrary, it forces left-wing movements to understand why they lost the trust of broad segments of society and to rebuild a credible alternative.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://chatgpt.com/s/m_6aed44d0200081918529bb49712d3862&quot;&gt;Source&lt;/a&gt; for the cover image, generated with GPT technology.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTJpU2QEEn3cMFiMF4KHr5VQg13X6gCTjiwBpd3YdA8WU/thanks_for_your_reading_1_.gif&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-120417</category></item><item><title>Census API Updated with Data on Authorized U.S. Exports to Cuba</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-196387/@limonta/census-api-updated-with-data</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-196387/@limonta/census-api-updated-with-data</guid><description>For the first time, authorized U.S. exports of goods to Cuba have crossed the $1 billion threshold—the counter has temporarily stopped at $1.09653 billion—according to U.S. Census Bureau data updated through September. The figures show nearly 9% month-over-month growth across all products in…</description><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 05:29:51 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmYgQvTkPdyZ1a5USQeGr4QJ6hKy32vMvUim7E6zvZZVbb/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_05_01_05_21.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;For the first time, authorized U.S. exports of goods to Cuba have crossed the $1 billion threshold—the counter has &lt;em&gt;temporarily&lt;/em&gt; stopped at $1.09653 billion—according to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.census.gov/data/developers.html&quot;&gt;U.S. Census Bureau data&lt;/a&gt; updated &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2390.html&quot;&gt;through September&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The figures show nearly 9% month-over-month growth across all products in September. The increase is even more pronounced for agricultural and food products, with a reported &lt;strong&gt;62.3% rise&lt;/strong&gt;, bringing September exports to approximately $97.6 million and the year-to-date total to $412 million.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Amid the economic strangulation policy imposed on Cuba, the United States has become &lt;em&gt;the&lt;/em&gt; trading partner through these sales, generally channeled through the private sector, the only one with the capacity to finance imports—a dynamic, of course, welcomed in Washington.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Donations stand out at approximately $180 million for the January–September period, followed by two HS10 fuel categories: light fuel oil ($121.2 million in export value in September alone) and gasoline ($82.1 million). Among agricultural and food products, chicken remains king, with three HS10 categories in the top ten and a combined value exceeding $160 million. Solar panels and used vehicles are also noteworthy exports.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I am accessing these figures through a tool I have built with &lt;strong&gt;Claude&lt;/strong&gt;. It retrieves, in real time, information published by Census.gov that is relevant to Cuba. But its added value lies elsewhere: it allows users to explore and interact with the data through several established layers of analysis. For example, chicken leg quarters were traded on an F.A.S. basis at a derived price of $1.15 per kilogram, while a dozen eggs averaged $2.27.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I am promoting access to this tool, which, again, provides powerful AI-driven analytical capabilities, as part of a short but useful training program on U.S. sanctions against Cuba—and, more importantly, on the general authorizations that make many of these transactions possible.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTqn6Eu7fckuJsNcAr1xjLJHDNrVBBihXN5SF7K9LaY57/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_05_01_04_12.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmdE5a9sXxmyDGcuPVAvV8FUGBDYNEAjwZ5ZJEmFdTtpqk/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_05_01_03_15.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmQPV8H4WhoNQg2wZMLobQpsN9f5xjX45LnfinaoVEouGG/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_05_00_26_49.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmQkxgiVj915Xo3GkbndNZy9GBswmdxEWMyPctM1a44enc/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_04_23_52_06.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTJpU2QEEn3cMFiMF4KHr5VQg13X6gCTjiwBpd3YdA8WU/thanks_for_your_reading_1_.gif&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-196387</category></item><item><title>Building a Florida-focused 2026 Midterms Tracker with Claude&apos;s Sonnet 5.5</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-196387/@limonta/building-a-florida-focused-2026</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-196387/@limonta/building-a-florida-focused-2026</guid><description>I want to share a concrete result from working with Claude&apos;s Sonnet 5.5 again on a real civic-data problem. The outcome is a small, runnable Flask application that tracks 2026 U.S. midterm results from three sources: The People&apos;s Tally, Open America, and—most importantly to me—the Florida Division…</description><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 03:47:54 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmNg1Yqypo4prSPQS1fZ68YVZCGyxt1eKtTrLDbFRtAi4y/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_03_23_39_38.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;I want to share a concrete result from working with Claude&apos;s Sonnet 5.5 again on a real civic-data problem. The outcome is a small, runnable Flask application that tracks 2026 U.S. midterm results from three sources: The People&apos;s Tally, Open America, and—most importantly to me—the Florida Division of Elections directly. Claude did the homework, with massive design and coding. Florida was an easy case because &lt;a href=&quot;https://floridaelectionwatch.gov/&quot;&gt;Florida Election Watch&lt;/a&gt; publishes election-night results on a single, fairly stable site, and it also exposes pipe-delimited result files with fields like party code, candidate name, votes, district, and precincts reporting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Texas is the counterexample. It can be done, but not by swapping a URL. Texas results are decentralized: the Secretary of State publishes statewide election information, while individual counties provide results through different formats and reporting systems. Open America does include Texas among its 22 state feeds, but its statewide figures do not necessarily provide district-level results. Replicating Florida&apos;s level of detail therefore means writing additional adapters and accounting for differences in geographic granularity—real engineering, not a one-line change. The same unevenness holds nationally, which is exactly why aggregators like The People&apos;s Tally and Open America exist, and why their coverage remains incomplete.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here is the core of the Florida parser, which extracts candidate names, party codes, and vote totals from the election-night HTML:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;FL_PARTIES = &quot;REP|DEM|NPA|LPF|WRI|IND|GRE|CPF|ECO|FFP|ASP|AMF|BPP|CPP|CSV|JEF|MGT|PSL|RFM|NAT|NOP&quot;
FL_CAND = re.compile(rf&quot;([^|&amp;lt;&amp;gt;]+?)\s+({FL_PARTIES})\s+(\d[\d,]*)(?:\s+(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*%)?&quot;)

def fl_candidates(seg: str) -&amp;gt; list[dict]:
    seg = FL_HEADER.split(seg, 1)[-1]
    seg = re.split(r&quot;\bTotal\b&quot;, seg, maxsplit=1)[0]
    out = []
    for m in FL_CAND.finditer(seg):
        words = m.group(1).split()
        if len(words) &amp;gt; 6:
            words = words[-4:]  # fallback if table header was missed
        out.append({
            &quot;name&quot;: &quot; &quot;.join(words),
            &quot;party&quot;: party_code(m.group(2)),
            &quot;votes&quot;: int(m.group(3).replace(&quot;,&quot;, &quot;&quot;)),
        })
    return out
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And here is how the Claude-built app merges sources without pretending to know more than it does—Florida&apos;s official count takes precedence, while calls and reporting percentages from other sources are preserved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;fl_rows, fl_status = fetch_florida()
for fr in fl_rows:
    old = merged.get(fr[&quot;race_id&quot;])
    if old:  # Florida&apos;s official count wins; keep calls and % reporting
        old.update(
            candidates=fr[&quot;candidates&quot;], leader=fr[&quot;leader&quot;],
            total_votes=fr[&quot;total_votes&quot;], source=fr[&quot;source&quot;],
            status=fr[&quot;status&quot;], priority=bool(old.get(&quot;priority&quot;)) or fr[&quot;priority&quot;],
        )
    else:
        merged[fr[&quot;race_id&quot;]] = fr
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Senate snapshot is deliberately conservative. It starts from the 53–47 baseline and only moves a seat when a race is explicitly called—no forecasting, no invented results:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;def senate_snapshot(rows: list[dict], registry: dict) -&amp;gt; dict:
    # 2026 pre-election baseline: 53 R; 45 D + 2 independents caucusing with D.
    # Only an explicitly called result changes a seat. This is not a forecast.
    r_total, d_total = 53, 47
    changes = []
    ...
    return {
        &quot;baseline&quot;: {&quot;republican&quot;: 53, &quot;democratic_caucus&quot;: 47},
        &quot;snapshot_republican&quot;: r_total,
        &quot;snapshot_democratic_caucus&quot;: d_total,
        &quot;majority_threshold&quot;: 51,
        &quot;method&quot;: &quot;Baseline composition + seat changes with a called winner; not a projection.&quot;,
    }
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The lesson, again, is not that an LLM replaces engineers. It is that an LLM can compress the distance between an idea and a testable artifact—a regex here, a cache there, a retry policy—so that more of our energy goes to judgment: what to trust, what to label unofficial, what to flag as missing. Florida rewarded that judgment because its data is quite reachable. Where a state does not, the right move is to say so: label the race &lt;code&gt;no_data&lt;/code&gt;, cite the aggregator, and avoid pretending coverage is complete.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The full code is &lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/yagru-alvarez/midterms-2026-tracker&quot;&gt;public&lt;/a&gt; and runnable:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre&gt;&lt;code&gt;pip install -r requirements.txt
python app.py
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;
&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmWD76Gy4kFvPpEpvCx5T2bwCPv5pzMUb93fiDEESez1sE/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_03_23_42_37.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmVwY8Cdpw8EysqAsTGuCvp8tdC29fGZs4bDHdWMGnvEVb/captura_de_pantalla_2026_11_03_23_41_43.png&quot; /&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTJpU2QEEn3cMFiMF4KHr5VQg13X6gCTjiwBpd3YdA8WU/thanks_for_your_reading_1_.gif&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-196387</category></item><item><title>Cuba&apos;s Socialist Project in the Age of Donald Trump</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-122315/@limonta/cuba-s-socialist-project-in</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-122315/@limonta/cuba-s-socialist-project-in</guid><description>Following the devastating collapse of the USSR, Cuba&apos;s political leadership, then headed by Fidel Castro, embarked on a turbulent process of market-oriented reforms. Today, I want to focus on one key aspect of that process: how the private sector is managed, defining its place in the economy and…</description><pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 02:03:18 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmNSa8XveZn5ZoMq8P8MHwNhTcGLLokrm3jHrcUyiBLKKN/dmtyapuu8aeqoiy.jpeg&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;&lt;p&gt;Following the devastating collapse of the USSR, Cuba&apos;s political leadership, then headed by Fidel Castro, embarked on a turbulent process of market-oriented reforms. Today, I want to focus on one key aspect of that process: how the private sector is managed, defining its place in the economy and setting boundaries to ensure it occupies that place, and no other.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the revolutionary process, private property has regularly been regarded as a &quot;necessary evil,&quot; a view rooted in two plausible interpretations. The first, more sympathetic to the Havana government, suggests a genuine and enduring concern about the effects of the (un)controlled expansion of market forces on the vast majority of the population, many of whom struggle to secure the material conditions necessary for their everyday lives. This perspective would also reflect a sincere commitment to safeguarding both the form and substance of the social project: respect for certain non-negotiable principles and limits. In other words, the familiar maxim that &quot;it doesn&apos;t matter what color the cat is, as long as it catches mice&quot; does not apply here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second explanation for the Cuban socialist project&apos;s aversion to private property is less charitable toward the Cuban Revolution. It holds that this resistance stems from an ingrained inclination toward control and the preservation of a ruling caste&apos;s privileges. The argument is that there is a fear that the structures allegedly extracting wealth from the national treasury and dominating the economic landscape—including, notably, the debate over the military&apos;s role in the economy—could be displaced by a dynamic, emerging private sector capable of outperforming them in a competition governed by clear and transparent rules. Of course, a fair point must be made here: the state sector is not depressed solely because of mismanagement at every level, but also—and often above all—because of U.S. policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This brings us to the question of why, this time around, what once seemed impossible to legislate and regulate in revolutionary Cuba was not only accomplished with little or no debate, in an expedited process, but also why measures that had &lt;em&gt;never&lt;/em&gt; even been contemplated became part of the extraordinary and far-reaching economic reform now underway here.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lacking solid and representative external support, the country increasingly found itself adrift, like a weather vane at the mercy of the wind. The state steadily lost its capacity to meet basic needs, to the point that a widely debated but still useful distribution mechanism for many people—the so-called &lt;em&gt;libreta de abastecimiento&lt;/em&gt;, or ration book, which allocated a basic food basket to each person every month—collapsed under the weight of circumstances. The government had never truly wanted to abolish it because it was an intrinsic part of the social contract.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under these circumstances, directly linked to a sharp escalation of the U.S. economic war—beginning with Trump&apos;s &lt;em&gt;first administration&lt;/em&gt; and intensifying to unprecedented and inhumane levels from January onward, following Maduro&apos;s ouster in Venezuela and, with it, the demise of what might be called original &lt;em&gt;Chavismo&lt;/em&gt;—the Cuban leadership had no alternative. This time, it really had no alternative but to turn to the private sector to keep the economy moving.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And that is precisely what it is doing, albeit with a very &lt;em&gt;costly inability&lt;/em&gt; to connect this sector&apos;s potential to the country&apos;s most urgent and strategic interests. What is particularly concerning is that this is where the very possibility of continuing to speak of a socialist project in Cuba now lies: in the state&apos;s ability to redirect the financial resources—rather than, for the time being, the productive capacity—of private entrepreneurs toward meeting Cubans&apos; most basic needs without delay.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With appropriate support, less bureaucracy, and sound policies grounded in genuine consensus, this is achievable. It would allow social assistance, so central to the Cuban project, to benefit from the potential trickle-down effects of an orderly expansion of private enterprise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Private enterprise can no longer be treated as an inconvenient appendage that might be discarded in January 2029—assuming Cuba can survive Trump in human terms until then. Instead, it must be organically integrated into the project, recognized not merely as an important actor but as a critical one for its success, provided it operates within certain agreed-upon parameters.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Alongside this, Cuba must preserve the other two essential pillars that took shape in the years following January 1959: free and universal healthcare and education, ensuring that money does not determine access to medical care or an individual&apos;s ability to pursue self-improvement in keeping with their talents.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://hive.blog/hive-122315/@limonta/cuba-s-socialist-project-in&quot;&gt;Read the full post&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-122315</category></item><item><title>The Challenge of Apportioning Responsibility for Cuba’s Polycrisis</title><link>https://hive.blog/hive-122315/@limonta/the-challenge-of-apportioning-responsibility</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://hive.blog/hive-122315/@limonta/the-challenge-of-apportioning-responsibility</guid><description>Apportioning causal responsibility for Cuba’s polycrisis between external and internal factors remains a largely unexplored scientific endeavor. Some see the Cuban government as primarily responsible for the country&apos;s predicament, while others regard the increasingly aggressive and punitive U.S.…</description><pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 08:58:30 GMT</pubDate><content:encoded>&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmdUdZTLxBAUrM8PW9TyiVPDvxSXUUgmE7V7M6HaMoZyTf/htauyowwiaazav8.jpeg&quot; /&gt;&lt;p&gt;Apportioning causal responsibility for Cuba’s polycrisis between external and internal factors remains a largely unexplored scientific endeavor. Some see the Cuban government as primarily responsible for the country&apos;s predicament, while others regard the increasingly aggressive and punitive U.S. policy as the factor that explains almost everything. And some acknowledge shared, balanced responsibility, considering any percentage-based allocation—how much of the overall burden is attributed to each factor—subjective and potentially adjustable in either direction. I count myself among this latter group.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yet, again, the rigorous scientific work required to address this question, involving the systematic examination of every single factor, external and internal, broken down into its constituent elements, has not been done. Clearly, such an undertaking would itself be shaped by subjectivity and ideological affiliations, since science always develops within a specific context that encourages certain lines of inquiry, constrains others, and influences those engaged in it. The point, however, is that, as a rule, this kind of research should rest on firmer foundations and be better protected against extremism and crude analytical distortions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I consider external factors the most decisive, either because they are the actual underlying cause of the problems or because they can at least provide a rational explanation for them. They can be facts or working &lt;em&gt;hypotheses&lt;/em&gt;, but the mere possibility of advancing them as such casts a heavy shadow: one that either prevents sociopolitical progress or clouds our thinking. Consider Cuba&apos;s democratic shortcomings. I start from the premise that liberal democracy is not necessarily a robust model of democracy—I would hardly consider the Biden/Harris versus Donald Trump showdown in the United States a particularly compelling demonstration of democratic choice. Nevertheless, the Cuban alternative has not demonstrated sufficient maturity across a range of areas, including the administration of political dissent and rights that are not &quot;bourgeois&quot; privileges but inalienable individual rights, such as freedom of expression.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, it is rational to consider the possibility of an authoritarian inclination within the historical and contemporary political leadership of the process we know as the Cuban Revolution. At the same time, it is entirely plausible to argue that this leadership has necessarily had to resort to restricting a representative range of political rights as a means of defending itself against the blatant and open interference of the United States in Cuba&apos;s internal affairs, whose declared objective is regime change and whose actions are consistent with that goal. In other words, if Washington supports media outlets through covert—or, at the very least, less-than-transparent—means, is the decision not to make room for an independent press entirely outside the bounds of rational political reasoning? If the same applies to certain political actors who challenge the legitimacy of the existing political system, is an aversion to dissenting activity altogether unexpected?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;None of this legitimizes or condones any documented act of repression or political harassment. Such conduct falls within the realm of the referred inability to manage, in the most coherent and legally sound manner, a &lt;em&gt;real&lt;/em&gt; and &lt;em&gt;objective&lt;/em&gt; national security problem. Abstracting and disentangling these factors to examine the political dimension of the crisis scientifically is a monumental, almost Herculean task. It may be even more challenging than doing so in the economic sphere, where the impact of individual variables is comparatively easier to isolate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://x.com/ARodriguezAP/status/2103203784960901559&quot;&gt;Source&lt;/a&gt; for the cover image, obtained via X.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;center&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://i.ecency.com/DQmTJpU2QEEn3cMFiMF4KHr5VQg13X6gCTjiwBpd3YdA8WU/thanks_for_your_reading_1_.gif&quot; /&gt;&lt;/center&gt;</content:encoded><dc:creator>limonta</dc:creator><category>hive-122315</category></item></channel></rss>